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Abstract
This essay presents an analysis of the conversational role of disambiguation, with
special attention to disambiguating parentheticals such as ’bats, the furry animals, are
not easy to find’. The essay proposes an enriched representation of conversational
states as pairs of an interpretation function and standard common belief, it represents
disambiguations within the ensuing framework, and, on the basis of these conceptual
tools, it proposes a systematic picture of the updates achieved by disambiguating
parentheticas.
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In what follows, I propose a formal framework for the conversational role of disam-
biguation, with a particular focus, in the second half of this essay, on the case of what
I call disambiguating parentheticals, as in:
(1) bats, the furry animals, are not easy to find
(2) I bought a bat (a pipistrelle).
Section one sketches a simple framework for the conversational updates engendered
by (assertoric, unchallenged, etc.) utterances in an unambiguous language. Section
two adapts this framework to the case of (lexically) ambiguous languages, and it
introduces disambiguations as elements of conversational states. Section three presents
themain concepts inmyanalysis of the conversational role of disambiguation: the ideas
of utterance-disambiguation and of updated disambiguation. After a few informal
hints on supplements in section four, section five applies my apparatus to the case of
disambiguating parentheticals such as (1) and (2).
A small caveat about my scenarios is in order before I begin. As evidenced by
(1) and (2), I take the noun ‘bat’ as the protagonist in my colloquial examples. In
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order to simplify my informal commentaries, I focus on the contrast between its two
most common interpretations, namely as a noun for certain wooden implements, or
as a noun designating the members of the order Cheiroptera. For brevity’s sake, I
also occasionally gloss these readings simply in terms of, respectively, ‘stick’ and
‘pipistrelle’, setting aside the fact that, in proper zoological jargon, ‘pipistrelle’ is
used to designate a subspecies of Cheiroptera.
1 Conversing in an unambiguous language
When you speak or write, I may occasionally focus my attention on the sounds or
scribbles you produce—if, for instance, I am absorbed in your tone of voice or in
your calligraphic skills. When we are engaged in a conversation, however, our interest
must be wider: those sounds or scribbles are tokened so as to exemplify fully-fledged
expressions and, as a result, to convey a meaning.
According to a standard format, an expressionmay be represented (at least for some
purposes) as a triple consisting of a phonological form (here, for convenience’s sake, a
string of letters), a syntactic category, and a meaning. As in, say: dog = < ‘dog’, noun,
being a dog > , where, for simplicity’s sake, a noun’s meaning is presented directly
as a property.1 A language may then be identified (at least for some purposes) with a
collection of the expressions in its lexicon, together with the phonological, syntactic,
and semantic regularities for the formationof complex affairs.Often leaving these latter
elements as implicit, I represent a language L simply as a class of lexical expressions,
as in, say, dog ∈ Eng(lish).2
According to a common way of speaking, some words are ambiguous, in the sense
that ‘they have more than one meaning’. Of course, if words are regimented as expres-
sions in the aforementioned sense, there can be no ambiguous words: trivially, for all
forms s, categories k1, k2, and meanings m1, m2, if m1 = m2 then < s, k1, m1 > = <
s, k2, m2 > . It will thus do to speak of ambiguous forms instead, as in the idea that the
three-letter form ‘bat’ may serve as the form of two different English expressions:
(a) bat1: < ‘bat’, noun, being a pipistrelle >
bat2: < ‘bat’, noun, being a stick > .
Officially, then, a lexical form s is ambiguous in L iff < s, k1, m1 > ∈ L and < s, k2,
m2 > ∈ L, where k1 = k2 or m1 = m2.3
Let a lexical form s be admissible in L iff ∃ k, m: < s, k, m > ∈ L. Then, L is an
unambiguous language iff no s admissible in L is ambiguous. So, an unambiguous
language L determines an interpretation function λL from (lexical) forms tomeanings:
1 See for instance (Potts, 2007) and (Kracht, 2007). More appropriately, meanings may be represented by
more fine-grained affairs, such as, say, Kaplan-style characters, namely functions which (given a context)
yield a content. The complications related to context-sensitive expressions and,more generally, to the proper
format for the representation of meaning are nevertheless of no immediate relevance for what follows.
2 Myallusion toEnglish as the languageof choice facilitatesmypresentation, but itmay safely be substituted
with alternative locutions pertaining to varieties of English, to dialects, or to idiolects.
3 Note that, for simplicity’s sake, my focus in what follows is restricted to ambiguous expressions of the
same category, as in the two senses of ‘bat’, rather than in the uses of, say, ‘well’ as a noun or an adverb.
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λL = {< s, m > : ∃k: < s, k, m > ∈ L}.4 For instance, if ‘dog’ is a form in an unambiguous
fragment of English, then that fragment’s interpretation function uniquely associates
that form with a particular meaning, such as the property of being a dog.
Unambiguous languages allow for a simple representation of the conversational
effects of an utterance. As before, take on board the language’s phonological, syntactic
and semantic regularities for the formation of complex expressions, and leave issues
of syntactic ambiguity aside. Then, a token of a sentential form S containing exactly
the lexical items s1 … sn is associated by λ (subscripts omitted for legibility’s sake)
with the unique proposition λ(S) = μ(λ(s1) … λ(sn)), where μ is the semantic effect
of S’s structure. For instance, the presumably unambiguous English sentential form
‘a dog is barking’ is mapped with the proposition that a dog is barking. Consequently,
as I am about to explain, your awareness of that token and your linguistic competence
suffice for recovering the the proposition that a dog is barking—for instance, in cases
of assertoric scenarios, as a proposed enrichment of common belief.5
Since utterances are manifest events (in the sense of Stalnaker, 2014), the assump-
tion of shared competence with an unambiguous L suffices to put the proposition
expressed by the uttered sentential form ‘on the conversational record’, roughly in
the sense that, if the utterance is accepted, that proposition becomes part of common
belief .6 I sharpen this idea with the help of some symbolism. Let a conversational state
σ for an unambiguous language L be a pair consisting of an interpretation function
λσ (= λL) and a set of propositions βσ , where λσ reflects the conversants’ shared
linguistic competence with L, or, at least, with the aspects of it that matter at that
stage, and βσ is the set of common beliefs in σ (subscripts in ‘λσ ’ and ‘βσ ’ here-
inafter omitted when irrelevant or obvious). As long as an utterance uS of S is publicly
available to all conversants, and as long as it is common belief among them that λ
is the appropriate interpretation function at that stage, what is thereby also publicly
available is the proposition λ(S), that is, the proposition expressed by S according to
λ. Then, the effect of an utterance uS on a state σ = < λ, β > is the enrichment of β
with that proposition:
(b) σ [uS] =< λ, β ∩ λ(S) >.7
4 I employ f as designating both the graph of a function f , that is, a set of pairs < x, y > , and the function
itself, as in f(x) = y.
5 The background is provided by the classic Stalnaker-inspired framework for conversational updates, see
for instance (Stalnaker, 1999) and the considerable ensuing literature; see Farkas and Bruce (2009) for the
idea of a proposed update. Here as before, I restrict my attention to simple assertoric, literal utterances of
indicative sentences, leaving aside the tangential and independent enrichments required for the treatment
of different types of sentences and/or speech-acts.
6 Stalnaker defines a manifest event as ‘something that happens in the environment of the relevant parties
that is obviously evident to all. … In such a case, it immediately becomes common knowledge that the
event has happened’ (Stalnaker, 2014: p. 47). See also the discussion of copresence in Clark and Marshall
(1981) and the analysis of its relationships with other accounts of mutual belief in Barwise (1988).
7 As usual, with the obvious qualification omitted, as in the implicit restriction to asserted indicative sen-
tences that are subsequently accepted by the conversants. Also: in my informal presentation, I occasionally
speak of the ‘addition’ of a proposition to common belief, and of as ‘growing’ accordingly. Of course, in




For instance, the effect of your utterance of the English sentence ‘a dog is barking’
is that of intersecting our antecedent common beliefs with λEng(‘a dog is barking’),
namely with the proposition that a dog is barking.
2 Updates with an ambiguous language: preliminaries
Ambiguous languages, that is, languages with ambiguous admissible forms, compli-
cate this picture. For instance, in the absence of further information, the manifest act
of tokening the English form ‘bat’ does not make manifest a unique expression, and
hence does not suffice for any contribution to propositional update. And so, as we
commonly say, it makes no sense to ask for an out-of-the -blue interpretation of ‘bat’:
what are proper objects of interpretations are either ‘bat1’ or ‘bat2’, the expressions
in (a). In the jargon from the previous paragraph, when L is an ambiguous language,
λ is a relation, but it is not a function. A form admissible in an ambiguous language
may then be associated with a particular meaning only on the basis of something over
and above λ, namely on the basis of what we commonly call a disambiguation.
I represent a disambiguation of lexical forms as a ‘pruning’ of λ, in the following
sense. Given an ambiguous lexical form s such that {< s, m1 >… < s, mn >}⊆ λ (with
m1 = … = mn, n > 1), a lexical disambiguation δs,i of s is such that.
(c) δs,i (λ) = λ− {< s, m j >∈ λ : j = i}.
For instance, given the representation in (a), the disambiguation δbat,1 of the English
ambiguous form ‘bat’ achieves the effect of obliterating the mapping of ‘bat’ with
the property of being a stick: δbat,1(λEng) = {< ‘bat’, m1 = pipistrelle > , < ‘bat’, m2
= stick >}—{< ‘bat’, m2 >}. As a result, δbat,1(λEng) uniquely associates ‘bat’ with
m1, so that all tokens of that form end up designating δbat,1(λEng)(‘bat’), namely the
property of being a pipistrelle.
Taking on board the compositional regularities for the formation, pronunciation,
and interpretation of complex expressions (and leaving aside issues of structural ambi-
guity), disambiguations allow for an extension of (b) to ambiguous languages. I present
the general traits of this extension in the remainder of this section, before I proceed to
some amendments in section three.
Given a language L containing the ambiguous lexical forms s1 … sn, a disambigua-
tion δL of L is a set of lexical disambiguations {δi… δj}, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i = j (I avoid
double subscripts and write ‘i’ for ‘si’ in ‘δI ’; I also omit the second subscript in
‘δs,m’ for legibility’s sake). A full disambiguation of L is a disambiguation {δi: 1 ≤ i
≤ n}, that is, colloquially, a set of all the disambiguation needed for dealing with the
language’s ambiguous forms. Let a disambiguation δ of L be adequate for a sentential
form S of L containing occurrences of the ambiguous forms si… sj iff {δi… δj} ⊆
δ; and let a disambiguation δ adequate for S be such that δ(λ)(S) = μ(δi(λ)(si), …
δj(λ)(sj)), where, as before, μ is intended to reflect the compositional effects of S’s
(non-ambiguous) structure. So, if δ is an adequate disambiguation for a sentential form
S, the function δ(λ) maps S to a unique proposition; and if δ is a full disambiguation
for L, δ(λ) is a function from all sentential forms in L to propositions.
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Enrich the representation of a conversational state for an ambiguous language L as
in σ = < < λ, δ > , β > , with λ and β as before, and δ a disambiguation for L. Then,
the effects of an utterance uS of S may preliminarily be recorded as follows. If δ is
adequate for S,
(d) σ [uS] =<< λ, δ >, β ∩ δ(λ)(S) >.
For instance, take a disambiguation δ of ‘bat’ and ‘bank’, such that δbat and δbank (∈
δ) select respectively the zoological and monetary senses of those forms. Then, as the
result of an utterance of the lexically ambiguous English sentential form ‘a bat went
to the bank’, the antecedent common belief β is enriched as in β ∩ that a pipistrelle
went to a financial establishment, that is, it is enriched with the proposition expressed
by that form on the basis of the disambiguation in question.
What if δσ is not adequate for S? In practice, communicative exchangesmaywell be
rather tolerant in this respect: if only ‘bat’ is disambiguated, an utterance of ‘a bat went
to a bank’ may perhaps suffice to intersect β with, say, the proposition that a pipistrelle
went somewhere. These independently interesting subtleties are nevertheless of no
immediate significance for what is about to follow. I thus adopt without further ado the
(independently harsh) simplification that conversational ambiguity fails to engender
any propositional update whatsoever.8 That is, for my purposes (and only for those)
it will do to assume that, if δσ is not adequate for S,
(e) σ [us] = σ .
Colloquially, all of the above reflects a certain initially intuitive picture of smooth
communication (perhaps modulo the stipulation in (e)). Informally, what is required
to communicate with an ambiguous language such as English is that (i) we share the
linguistic competence required from English speakers, (ii) we have common access to
appropriate disambiguating clues, and (iii) we share a set of common beliefs. Deciding
what, in practice, establishes the disambiguation appropriate at a particular conver-
sational stage, that is, determining what sort of clues matter for (ii), is, of course, a
notoriously difficult issue. For my purposes here, much that is of relevance for this
independently important question may safely be left to empirical investigations per-
taining to the roles of the conversants’ mental states, of the topic of conversation, of a
variety of environmental factors, and more besides. For pedagogical perspicuity, and
also in order to indirectly highlight my relative nonchalance on this issue, in what fol-
lows I occasionally settle for a simple-minded locational metaphor: when we converse
at the zoo, so I write, ‘bat’ generally takes on the meaning of ‘pipistrelle’, whereas, if
we are chatting at Yankee Stadium, it becomes associated with the meaning of ‘stick’.
And yet, certain other aspects related to (ii) do matter for my aims, since these are
features of a conversational state’s disambiguation that bear interesting relations to
that state’s other components, and in particular with common belief. And so, they are
aspects that matter from my viewpoint, namely for the analysis of the conversational
role of disambiguations and, eventually, for the application of my framework to the
case of disambiguating parentheticals. I proceed to their study in the next section.
8 In other words, for simplicity’s sake, I focus on cases of full disambiguation and I dismiss cases of partial
disambiguation (as when ‘a bat went to the bank’ is interpreted with respect to a disambiguation of ‘bat’,
without an accompanying disambiguation of ‘bank’).
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3 Disambiguations and updates
In section two I flanked my presentation of (d) and my informal gloss with a repeated
caveat: this is a preliminary depiction of the update engendered by an utterance in an
ambiguous language. One point is worthy of note: (d), and for that matter (b), take
a conservative approach towards a conversational state’s first element, namely λ in
the case of (b) and < λ, δ > in the case of (d). These approaches are conservative in
the sense that, according to (b) and (d), the interesting effect of an update is solely
that of intersecting β with an appropriate proposition: the antecedent state σ and
the resulting state σ [uS] have the first element in common. For the purpose of what
follows, I grant (merely for simplicity’s sake) that this much is appropriate when it
comes to λ, in the sense that we enter a conversation with a common assumption of
linguistic competence, which we keep unchanged as we proceed.9
But the case with δ is of greater interest. Section two wrapped things up with
a deliberately casual attitude towards typical sources of disambiguation. There, I
simply gestured towards certain plausible candidates, and I eventually settled on a
simple-minded metaphor: other things being equal, an utterance of ‘bat’ at the zoo is
interpreted according to the zoological sense of that term, and it leaves the stick-related
meaning aside. And yet, of course, even conversations taking place at the zoo may
occasionally digress on baseball, and, on those occasions, ‘bat’ may end up taking on
a different meaning than that related to pipistrelles. Once again, many of the reasons
why this may be the case can safely be left aside for my purposes. But others are of
significance as an informal background for the central ideas in this section: the notion
of an utterance-disambiguation, and the related revision of the conservative stance
summarized in the foregoing paragraph, namely the notion of updated disambigua-
tion.
Suppose that, out of the blue and with no particular environmental clues in place,
I say.
(3) bats locate obstacles by echolocation,
and that you correctly hypothesize that what I proposed was a proposition about
pipistrelles. In abstract, I suppose, your hypotheses are defeasible. In principle, that
is, I could perhaps have used that sentential form in order to express the absurd belief
that wooden sticks employ certain methods for the location of objects, and I could
have done so without thereby relinquishing my status of competent English speaker.
Yet, as I am about to explain, there are reasons why this option would have been
conversationally less than optimal.
The reasons in question depend on β, our antecedent stock of common beliefs. In
general,
communication, whether linguistic or not, normally takes place against a back-
ground of beliefs or assumptions which are shared by the speaker and his
9 Incidentally, my discussion also often implicitly takes on board the unrealistic assumption that our com-
petence is complete, in the sense that the domain of is the class of all admissible forms (as in the pretence
that we enter a conversation under the assumption that any English sentence will fall under our common
mastery of that language). Rectifying these unrealistic assumptions is an independently interesting task, but
it may safely be left aside here.
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audience, and which are recognized by them to be so shared. ...The more com-
mon ground we can take for granted, the more efficient our communication will
be. (Stalnaker, 1999: p. 48)
In a standard scenario for (3), then, communication efficiently proceeds on the
basis of common beliefs such as the obvious facts that sticks are inanimate, that what
locates obstacles is generally sentient, that pipistrelles are animals, and other affairs
of that sort. Accordingly, the interpretation of (3) naturally adjusts in conformity
with the immediate entailments of these beliefs: the speaker would have blatantly
contradicted β unless she intended to speak of pipistrelles, that is, unless she intended
‘bat’ to be disambiguated accordingly. In a nutshell, and in plain English: we generally
disambiguate not only by taking into consideration the topic of conversation or the
state of our surrounding environment, but also by appealing to common sense. That
is, colloquially, we appeal, among other things, to certain aspects of the utterance in
question—the facts that, say, the disambiguation of its form along baseball-related
lines yields a preposterous result, and that its zoological disambiguation would nicely
complement our antecedent understanding.
In what follows, I begin to sharpen these ideas by means of the idea of utterance-
disambiguation. Let an adequate disambiguation δ of a sentential form S containing
exactly the ambiguous lexical form s1 … sn beminimal iff δ = {δ1… δn}. Theutterance-
disambiguation υ S,σ engendered by an utterance of S with respect to a state σ = <
< λ, δ > , β > is a minimal disambiguation such that.
(f) if for all disambiguations δ other than δ*, δ(λ)(S) ∩ β = ∅, then υS,σ = δ*;
otherwise υ S,σ = ∅.
So, an utterance-disambiguation engendered by S is the unique disambiguation δ, if
any exists, such that disambiguating S with δ is compatible with common belief. For
instance, the utterance-disambiguation υ (3) achieved by (3) is the unique disambigua-
tion consistent with the aforementioned common-sense beliefs about bats, sentient
beings, and sticks. Since the disambiguation that interprets ‘bat’ as designating sticks
yields an absurd result, υ (3) disambiguates that form in the zoological sense.10
Let σ be a state < < λ, δ > ,β > such that δ = {δm… δn}, let S contain exactly the
ambiguous lexical forms si… sj, and let A = {m … n} ∩ {i … j}. Define the updated
disambiguation ψ S,σ achieved on σ by an utterance of S as in.
(g) ψ S,σ= (δ − {δn : n ∈ A}) ∪ υS,σ .
Suppose for instance that a disambiguation δ is antecedently in place in the setting for
my utterance of (3), which is either silent when it comes to ‘bat’, or which associates
it with sticks. That is, metaphorically, suppose that I am uttering (3) out of the blue
or at Yankee Stadium. According to (g), the verdict yielded by δ on ‘bat’, if any, is
10 Note that my account focuses on a case of particular interest, namely the sort of reflexive scenario in
which, informally speaking, the disambiguation of S is achieved by the utterance of S itself. That is clearly
not equivalent to the notion that this is the only source of disambiguation I admit. More interestingly, it
also does not amount to the idea that no utterance of sentences other than S may have a bearing on S’s
disambiguation, as in ‘I bought a bat; my sister loves these animals’ (thanks to an anonymous referee for
suggesting this example). Especially due to my focus on disambiguating parentheticals in the latter parts
of this essay, I leave these independently important generalizations aside.
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removed, and the result is enriched with the updated disambiguation engendered by
(3), namely the zoological reading of that term. In a nutshell: other things being equal,
if no previous clues were present that hinted at a disambiguation of ‘bat’, an utterance
of (3) puts things in order. And even if contrasting hints had been in place, as in a
conversation about baseball, (3) provides overt signals of a shift in disambiguating
procedures.
The proposal in (d) can now be rectified: given a state σ = < < λ, δ > , β >
(h) σ [uS] =<< λ,ψ S >,β ∩ ψ S(λ)(S) >
(second superscript on ψ omitted). For instance, an utterance of (3) enriches β with
ψ (3)(λ)(3), that is, with the proposition that pipistrelles locate obstacles by echoloca-
tion.
A further English example may be appropriate, both as an additional informal
clarification of (h) and as a hint towards further aspects of disambiguation. Take.
(4) bats are furry animals and banks are for money
and a state σ such that β includes common-sense beliefs about pipistrelles and all
the rest, and such that δ yields, say, the religious meaning of the (here, irrelevant)
word ‘icon’ and the stick meaning for ‘bat’, as in δ = {δicon, δbat , …}. According
to (g), since the sentential form (4) contains ‘bat’, an utterance of (4) ‘instructs’ to
subtract δbat from δ. What is added to the result is the utterance-disambiguation υ that
maps ‘bat’ with its zoological sense and ‘bank’ with its financial meaning, thereby
obtaining {δicon, υbat , υbank , …}. So, according to (h), σ [u(4)] is a state containing (i)
that disambiguation, and (ii) the intersection of β with the proposition that pipistrelles
are furry animals and that financial institutions are for money.
This has a noteworthy consequence: given normal common-sense background
beliefs, the effects achieved by (4) on β are trivial, since the desired interpretation
has been obtained precisely on the basis of a process grounded on the idea that the
aforementioned proposition was already part of common belief. This is as it should
be: an utterance of (4) is indeed informationally idle against the shared background
of minimally informed speakers. And yet, utterances of trivialities such as (4) are
not inevitably out of place in the economy of conversation. In particular, their effects
on an antecedent state σ have to do with the replacement of δ with ψ (4). Informally
speaking, that is, some utterances are put forth not with the primary aim of affecting
common belief, but with the objective of constraining how certain utterances are to be
interpreted.11
The applications of my formal apparatus to particular conversational instances will
need to confront a variety of independent issues related to the idiosyncratic aspects of
the examples under study. For concreteness’ sake, I thus elect a particular phenomenon
asmy favourite implementation of the aforementionedmechanisms of disambiguation,
the case of disambiguating parentheticals such as (1) and (2) at the beginning of this
essay. Before I turn to this task, I provide a brief (and relatively negotiable) background
on supplements in the next section.
11 This idea may have further repercussion on a variety of only superficially unrelated debates. An anony-
mous referee suggests an intriguing phenomenon, the idea ofmetalinguistic negotiation discussed (primarily
in relation to legal discourse) in Plunkett and Sundell (2014) and (2021).
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4 Supplements and disambiguating parentheticals: informal
preliminaries
Supplements have received a great deal of attention in linguistics. Classic examples
include so-called non-restrictive relative clauses, as in.
(5) I spent part of every summer until I was ten with my grandmother, who lived in
a working-class suburb of Boston (Potts, 2004: p. 6)
and nominal appositives such as.
(6) Ames, a successful spy, is now behind bars (Potts, 2004: p. 90),
or for that matter.
(7) bats, the topic of John’s dissertation, have been in decline recently.
A few remarks on these examples suffice for my purposes here. The first has to do
with the widespread sense that the informational contribution of a supplement is, in
some sense, that of an aside. So, supplements are ‘expressions that permit speakers
to comment upon their assertions, to do a bit of editorializing in the midst of asking
questions and imposing demands’ (Potts, 2004: 8). For instance, in the case of (5),
the proposition that the speaker’s mother lived in a suburb of Boston is a commentary
appended as an amplification of (5)’s main claim, namely that the speaker spent the
summers of her youth with her grandmother. Similarly (taking on board the obvious
interpretations of the nominal appositives respectively as in ‘Ames was a successful
spy’ and ‘bats are the topic of John’s dissertation’), (6) and (7) say that Ames is
behind bars and that bats have been in decline recently, together with the ‘appended
amplifications’ that Ames was a successful spy and that bats are the topic of John’s
dissertation.12
The pre-theoretic idea of ‘being an aside’ is unquestionably worthy of theoretical
reflection, and it has received a great deal of attention in the current literature on
conversational structure.13 Yet, I briefly touched upon this apparent peculiarity of
the appositives in (5)–(7) merely to note that, for my purposes, these independently
important enrichments of our picture of conversation are of no immediate concern.
And so, for pedagogical perspicuity, I continue with a simple-minded understanding
of β as an unstructured collection of propositions, occasionally reminding the reader
of the independent adjustments needed whenever certain peculiarities of supplements
come to the foreground. As a result, in my simple-minded approach, one way or
12 What I am simple-mindedly ‘taking on board’ blatantly bypasses the delicate issues pertaining to the
syntactic and compositional regularities governing appositives (for a sense of the controversy surrounding
these issues see for instance the contrast between McCawley, 1998 and Potts, 2004). Presenting and moti-
vating my favourite view on these matters would take me well beyond the limits of this essay, especially in
light of the fact that the aforementioned uncontroversial pre-theoretic intuitions about content (such as the
notion that, among other things and in some special sense, (6) is also associated with the claim that Ames
was a successful spy) suffice for my purposes in what follows.
13 Various conceptual tools have been mobilized for the theoretical analysis of this intuition, ranging from
Potts’ divide between at-issue and non-at-issue content, to more detailed distinctions between the different
discursive roles that may be played by an utterance; see among many Roberts (1996), Asher and Lascarides
(2003), Potts (2004), Amaral et al. (2007), Portner (2007), and Anderbois et al. (2015).
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another, utterances of (5), (6), or (7) simply propose to update β as in β ∩ π1 ∩ π2,
where π1 and π2 are the aforementioned propositions. Preliminarily, then, given a
sentential form S of the form M(A), M a ‘main sentence’ and A an ‘appositive’,
(i) σ [uS] =<< λ, δ >, β ∩ δ(λ)(M) ∩ δ(λ)(A) >.
The reason for my overtly casual attitude here has to do with the fact that what
matters for my topic are not the phenomena exemplified by (5), (6), or (7) per se, but
rather the contrast between the effects of typical utterances of, say, (5), (6), or (7),
and the outcomes engendered by the cases mentioned at the beginning of this essay,
namely.
(1) bats, the furry animals, are not easy to find,
(2) I bought a bat (a pipistrelle),
or for that matter.
(8) bats (pipistrelles) are not easy to find, but you can get a bat (a hitting device)
anywhere.
Assume the obvious disambiguation δ of ‘bat’ in the zoological sense. Then, according
to a simple-minded application of (i) to, say, (1), what results from an utterance of
that sentence is β ∩ δ(λ)(that pipistrelles are not easy to find) ∩ δ(λ)(that pipistrelles
are furry animals), where β is the conversants’ antecedent common belief. Still in any
common scenario, that pipistrelles are furry animals may safely be assumed to have
already been part ofβ, themutual cognitive arsenal of anyminimally informed speaker.
Propositional update, then, would effectively yield merely β ∩ δ(λ)(that pipistrelles
are not easy to find), a propositional outcome that fails to record any conversational
difference between (1) and its simpler companion ‘bats are not easy to find’.
And yet, clearly, (1), (2), and (8) do not seem to be conversationally on a par with
their parenthetical-free counterparts. Indeed, figuratively speaking, the very banality
of the content of those parentheticals is precisely what holds the key to the explanation
of their role—that is, of the intuitive notion that, in this case, what must be at issue is
a disambiguation of ‘bat’ in the zoological sense, rather than in the sense of ‘stick’. In
a nutshell: the point of the parentheticals is not the enrichment of common belief, but
rather the indication of the conversationally appropriate disambiguation. I thus refer
to (typical occurrences of the parentheticals in) (1), (2), and (8) as disambiguating
parentheticals. I proceed to a clarification of my vague and informal preliminaries
about these affairs in the next section.
5 Disambiguating parentheticals and disambiguation update
Suppose I say (1). As a part of tokening (1), I am also presenting to my conversants.
(9) bats are furry animals,
namely the material embedded as a parenthetical. In abstracto, this sentential form
may be associated (according to λ, here for simplicity’s sake English) with different
claims, depending on the choice of δbat . And yet, the considerations about (3) from
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section three seem even more obviously relevant now: barring the preposterous claim
that sticks are furry animals, what must be at issue is the zoological sense of ‘bat’,
that is, a disambiguation δbat such that δbat(λ)(9) is the proposition that pipistrelles
are furry animals.
That this disambiguating choice is, as I colloquially put it, obvious is apparently the
positive side of the conundrum sketched towards the end of section four: although the
proposition that pipistrelles are furry animals is surely nothing to write home about,
the disambiguating effects achieved by (9) are conversationally noteworthy. Indeed,
they are noteworthy precisely insofar as they naturally steer our interpretive decisions
in the direction of the disambiguation appropriate for the main clause, that is, in the
case of (1),
(10) bats are difficult to find.
Now, clearly, what is at issue is the not at all trivial proposition that pipistrelles, rather
than wooder sticks, are rare.
The general ideas from section three, then, are naturally applicable to this case.
Consider an antecedent state σ = < < λ, δ > , β > where no resources are in
place for the disambiguation of ‘bat’, or, more dramatically, where δbat yields the
wooden stick sense of the term. In my metaphor, that is, imagine an out-of-the blue
conversation or an exchange taking place at Yankee stadium. According to (g), the
updated disambiguationψ (9) achieved by (9) disregards any previous disambiguation
of ‘bat’, if any was at all in place, and ‘instructs’ to interpret that expression as in
υ (9): the disambiguation δ such that δ(λ)(9) clashes with antecedent common belief
is disregarded, leaving only the zoological sense intact. The result is a state whose
common belief is β ∩ ψ (9(λ)(9) ∩ ψ (9(λ)(10), that is, given the obvious traits of
ψ (9(λ)(9), the common belief β ∩ ψ (9(λ)(10), i.e., the enrichment of β with the
proposition that pipistrelles are difficult to find.
To generalize, conceive for simplicity’s sake of affairs such as (1) as being of the
form.
(j) S = M1 ... n(Ai ... j )
where M (the ‘main clause’) is a sentential form containing the ambiguous lexical
forms s1… sn and A (the ‘nominal appositive’) is a sentential form containing the
ambiguous lexical forms si… sj. Then.
(k) σ [uS] =<< λ,ψ A >,β ∩ ψ A(λ)(M) ∩ ψ A(λ)(A) >.
This approach, as I am about to explain, reaches the apparently desired outcomeswhen
it comes to cases such as (1), (2), or (8).
For one thing, the suggestion in (k) reaches importantly different outcomes than
those appropriate for straightforward supplements such as (5) and its ilk. Those sup-
plements effect a standard update on β, since (in my simplified picture) σ [u(5)] =
< < λ, δ > , β ∩ π1 ∩ π2 > , where π1 and π2 are the propositions mentioned in
section four. On the other hand, the update on β engendered by, say, (1) is indifferent
to the parenthetical’s contribution, that is, to the proposition that pipistrelles are furry
animals, since that proposition is already part of β. This, in turn, entails an outcome
consistent with the intuition that the propositional point of a disambiguating paren-
thetical is that of enriching common belief merely with the claim encoded in its main
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clause. Indeed, given the definition of ψ A, this disambiguation is obtained by dis-
regarding disambiguations responsible for non-trivial additions to β, so that β ∩ ψ
A(λ)(M) ∩ ψ A(λ)(A) = β ∩ ψ A(λ)(M).
A second related consequence is most profitably highlighted by returning to the
fully superscripted format for the disambiguating update in question, namely ‘ψ A,σ ’:
the choice of the appropriate disambiguation depends on an aspect of the antecedent
state σ , that is βσ . Colloquially, the point is that obvious supplements are best suited
for the role of disambiguating parentheticals. This seems correct. Intuitively, the divide
between cases such as (1) and (7), repeated here.
(1) bats, the furry animals, are not easy to find
(7) bats, the topic of John’s dissertation, have been in decline recently
hinges on the epistemic status of John’s dissertation topic. And so, (1) is a better
candidate than (7) for disambiguating purposes, but it is so only given the assumption
that certain propositions, such as those pertaining to John’s research interests, aremore
likely to be informative than the notion that bats are furry animals.
A third related issue also deserves to be emphasized. At least according to a natural
understanding of the comments from the foregoing paragraphs, the divide between run-
of-the-mill supplements and disambiguating parentheticals is pragmatic, in the sense
of emerging from an approach to conversational exchanges. So, notwithstanding my
occasional description of certain sentences as involving disambiguating parentheticals,
what are of interest are the updates which their utterances engender on particular
conversational states. Utterances of (1) may well be more likely candidates than (7)
for disambiguating purposes, but the difference is not semantic, or, for that matter,
syntactic. In abstracto, then, the effects achieved by both sentences follow a parallel
pattern. Yet, in the case of (7) and given an antecedent disambiguation δ, a pair of
presumably interesting propositions enter common belief, namely that δ(λ)(‘bats’)
have been in decline and are the topic of John’s dissertation, but no noteworthy effects
on δ are detectable. In (1), on the other hand, the content of the antecedent belief β
already includes the propositional contribution of the supplement, whose interesting
role is fully reflected by its disambiguating effects.
As is often the case with pragmatic phenomena, their application to particular con-
crete scenarios remains a delicate business. For one thing, I suppose, utterances may,
on certain occasion, invite a partial retraction, readjustment, or accommodation of β.
And so, could we not utter (1) with the aim of expressing the beliefs that sticks are
furry animals that are hard to find, thereby inviting you to modify our antecedent com-
mon beliefs? Perhaps, even though such a move would clearly not be conversationally
optimal in the absence of spectacularly overt coordinating preliminaries:
(11) I am about to use ‘bat’ for these sort of things [holding a stick]. Here it comes:
bats, the furry animals, are not easy to find.
In my apparatus, the identification of a disambiguating update is also a rather direct
affair, grounded on the relationships between β and the proposition expressed by the
parenthetical. Some conversational exchanges may follow a more roundabout pattern.
For instance, I may say.
(12) bats, the exemplars of Chiroptera, are difficult to find.
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Disambiguating effects may well be in the air, even if it is not antecedently assumed
that bats belong in the order Chiroptera, and indeed even if the form ‘Chiroptera’ is
not part of our antecedent common competence. That sounds like one of those fancy
names for zoological classification, youmay reason.Whatmustmatter is the zoological
reading for ‘bat’, you conclude.14 This sort of reasoning is grounded on independent
additional phenomena, in particular having to do with the pragmatic repercussions of
register. I simply leave them aside as independently interesting epicycles external to,
but compatible with my general approach.
6 Conclusion and the road ahead
In this essay, I presented a general framework for disambiguation, and I applied it to
the case of disambiguations achieved by virtue of uttering certain sentences as part of
a conversational exchange, as in the case of (3) from section three. In section five, I
focused on an interesting application of this framework, the case of disambiguating
parentheticals, and I proposed an analysis of the contrast between run-of-the mill
appositives, such as (7), and disambiguating parentheticals such as (1).
As repeatedly mentioned, my approach aimed at highlighting certain interesting
traits of disambiguation in discourse, but explicitly steered clear from a fully-fledged
analysis of that phenomenon in its entirety. And so, disambiguations can surely be
achieved in ways other than those depicted in section three, and, even more obviously,
without the help of disambiguating parentheticals. Indeed, as I gestured in the final
paragraph of section five, even cases of this latter type may appeal to disambiguat-
ing procedures other than those explicitly depicted in (k). The issues confronting a
general theory of disambiguation, then, are uncontroversially delicate. My analysis,
being focused on a particular, albeit especially intriguing, disambiguating procedure is
thus insensitive to a variety of independently motivated complications—for instance,
having to do with other, and possibly conflicting disambiguating resources, with the
special status of appositive content, and with more besides.
Still, the outcomes are promising. In the spirit of an open-ended conclusion, I
mention a few phenomena that seem to be naturally amenable to analyses ensuing
from appropriate extensions of my framework (over and above those to which I have
already alluded in some of the footnotes). For one thing, with opportune adjustments,
the study of disambiguation seems to be naturally applicable to cases of homonymy-
resolution, with a parallel extension to parenthetical instances such as.
(16) Armstrong (the cyclist) is in trouble, but Armstrong (the astronaut) is a hero.
By the same token, extensions to structural ambiguity, ellipsis, or anaphora may not
be hard to come by, as in the parenthetical clarification of the pronoun in.
(17) Carroll’s objection is that in characterizing this practice Levinson is making
empirical claims andhe,Carroll, is not convinced…(Lamarque, 2008: p. 128).15
14 Consider also the case of directly linguistically oriented parentheticals, as in ‘bats, in the zoological
sense of that term, are not easy to find’.
15 A difficult but interesting further phenomenon has to do with instances of so-called desemanticized
occurrences, as in ‘bachelors are either unmarried males or holders of a first degree’, or, for a case closer
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The adaptations ofmy framework to these and other phenomenawill need to be judged
on their own merits. The enrichment of the representation of a conversational state
with medium-oriented affairs such as λ and δ is nevertheless a promising first step
towards a fuller understanding of an utterance’s conversational effects.
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Footnote 15 continued
to that mentioned in the previous footnote, ‘Cambridge is an asylum in both senses of the word’. The first
example is attributed to Seppänen 1974 in Predelli (2013): p. 161; the latter is generally credited to A. E.
Housman.
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